The Yale Law Journal Although arguments defending jury nullification had been raised in print before 1680,'0 the debate of the 1680s constituted the first open, extended discussion of the issue in England, and its repercussions continue into the present. In United States v. Thomas," a recent Second Circuit decision, the court ruled that "a juror who intends to nullify the applicable law is... subject to dismissal."12 Some have defended this holding, arguing that American courts have never tolerated nullification, 3 while others have criticized Thomas as a historically unprecedented infringement of the jury's rights. 4 This Note does not attempt to resolve that debate, although evidence suggests that some American courts in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries permitted jury law-finding to an extent that made nullification virtually inevitable. 15 Regardless of whether that evidence constitutes endorsement of nullification, however, Thomas and Bushell's Case are strikingly similar in their conclusions about the court's ability to respond to jurors who nullify. The Thomas court observed that the need to keep jury deliberations secret makes it nearly impossible for judges to prevent nullification. 6 Indeed, the court set a very high evidentiary standard in the imprint, however, does not necessarily indicate that the printer was the copyright holder. See infra note 103.
10. See GREEN, supra note 3, at 153-207 (discussing the pro-nullification pamphlets of John Lilbume and other Levellers, published in 1657).
11 609 (2000) (arguing that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, "the right to decide the law swept narrowly, placing a clear duty on juries to follow the law as they saw it, rather than reject the law as pro-nullification scholars would have them do").
14. See, e.g., Nancy S. 16. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 618 ("As a general rule, no one-including the judge presiding at a trial-has a 'right to know' how a jury, or any individual juror, has deliberated or how a decision was reached by a jury or juror."); id. at 621 ("Where... a presiding judge receives reports that a deliberating juror is intent on defying the court's instructions on the law, the judge may well have no means of investigating the allegation without unduly breaching the secrecy of deliberations.").
for judges who would dismiss nullifying jurors7-a standard that had not been met by the district court, with the result that the defendant was entitled to a new trial." 8 Similarly, Vaughan concluded that "legally it will be very hard to quit a jury that finds against the law." "9 Thomas and Bushell's Case reach nearly identical conclusions; the most salient difference is that Vaughan addressed the topic of nullification only implicitly, and his ambiguity on that subject made it possible for commentators to reshape his opinion during the ensuing debate. That debate arose because of a series of government-sponsored prosecutions in 1680-1681 of Whig dissidents accused of seditious libel and treason. King Charles H and his Tory supporters were initially successful in prosecuting their political opponents, but several of these cases were halted when grand juries dominated by Whigs returned findings of ignoramus (" we know nothing of it"), which indicated that the jurors saw no basis for pursuing the charges. In such cases, the judges had no means of circumventing the jury; the prosecution could bring the case again before another grand jury, but that effort seemed futile when the same Whigs controlled the venire. Political commentators seeking to justify the jurors' behavior found the perfect answer in Bushell's Case, published in 1677 in Vaughan's Reports. 2 " These writers' efforts were greatly assisted by the lapse in 1679 of the statute providing for government regulation of the press. Indeed, the lapse of the licensing regulations was the very reason for the flood of publications that the government was then attempting to curb by prosecuting the printers for seditious libel. Thus, Bushell's Case provoked heated debate over jurors' rights at a time when booksellers" were not only enjoying a newfound liberty to encourage political controversy in general, but were also personally concerned about the outcome of this particular debate. Vaughan's opinion reached a print marketplace that was ideally positioned to exploit the case.
This Note analyzes the process by which the "personal knowledge" claim was taken up in the 1680s and was ultimately rejected at the end of the following century. Part I reviews Bushell's Case itself in order to clarify 17 . Id. at 621-22 (" [ the different bases of Vaughan's argument. Part II examines the historical and political context in which the nullification debate occurred. The terms "Whig" and "Tory" first came into popular usage at the end of the 1670s, at a time when the Whigs in the House of Commons were struggling with the Crown's Tory affiliates in the House of Lords over the monarch's authority and the power to control the royal succession. These years witnessed the Exclusion Crisis (1679-1681), so named because the Whigs were attempting to pass legislation that would prevent Catholics from occupying the throne; the legislation was targeted specifically at Charles's brother, James, Duke of York. 22 During roughly the same period (1678-1684), England was reacting to threats of a "Popish Plot" to take over the government. 23 These conflicts provoked a nationwide crisis and generated a huge amount of print that the government attempted to suppress by prosecuting the more outspoken booksellers for seditious libel.
Part III discusses these trials and the responses they provoked. During the first months of 1680, the government launched several successful prosecutions against Whig booksellers, most notably Benjamin Harris, who had contributed energetically to the stream of pamphlets offering dire warnings about the Popish Plot and the dangers of allowing James to succeed to the throne. These prosecutions led to the first efforts to introduce Bushell's Case to the public of potential jurors in order to justify jury independence. Another successful prosecution followed in July, but as the year wore on, juries grew reluctant to follow the government's lead and opted instead to block the attacks with ignoramus bills. The Whig resistance to government control of the press, and of public opinion, began to assert itself.
Part IV turns to the loudly contested treason trials of 1681, in which the government prosecuted several Whig agitators who had sought to prevent James's succession and who had allegedly conspired to kidnap the King himself. 24 Among the targets of these prosecutions were the Earl of Shaftesbury (the leader of the Whig party) and two of his associates, Stephen Colledge and John Rouse. The Tories ultimately prevailed in their effort to facilitate James's succession and to extract guilty verdicts for Colledge and Rouse, 25 but each of these three prosecutions generated an (1999) (discussing the development of Whig ideology during and after the treason trials). 1 25. Rouse was hanged in 1683 after being implicated in the Rye House Plot, an alleged Whig conspiracy to kill both Charles and James. See ZOOK, supra note 24, at 87-113, 199. ignoramus bill along the way. As a result, they effectually routinized a series of defenses for jury nullification. This Part focuses on the trial of Colledge, whose exoneration by a London grand jury provoked an especially vituperative response from the Tories, including a long string of screeds in the Observator in Dialogue, the newspaper of the Tory journalist and government censor Roger L'Estrange. 26 His editorials, in turn, generated further defenses of nullification from the Whigs. The controversy about Colledge's case epitomizes a process that became familiar as the treason trials continued. The Tory criticisms and Whig defenses of the ignoramus bills set into circulation a whole kit of arguments concerning jurors' rights-and the debate was significant not only because of the claims the Tories criticized, but also because of the claims they conceded. Part V analyzes the importation of these late seventeenth-century arguments to the American colonies in the eighteenth century. Several Whig defenses of jury nullification were reprinted in the American colonies, and these arguments were repeated during the debates over the ratification of the Constitution. In the course of the eighteenth century, however, the English courts had become hostile to the idea that jurors might base their deliberations on personal knowledge that had never been made public in court. This change was also reflected in the American courts, and after the turn of the eighteenth century, the "personal knowledge" argument was hardly raised at all, except when it was cited in order to be rejected. American courts, however, continued well into the nineteenth century to uphold the jury's right to find law. 27 This pattern suggests that claims about the jurors' personal knowledge were useful in cultivating the defense of jury independence so that when they finally became untenable, Vaughan's other argument-concerning the juror's obligation to render an independent judgment-was sturdy enough to stand on its own. The debates of the early 1680s show that just one decade after Vaughan handed down his opinion, polemicists had redacted it into a set of arguments that would crucially influence the future of the argument over jury nullification. Just as Vaughan must have been aware that a petit jury could not be expected to have any personal knowledge about the case it was hearing, the Whig polemicists who recited Vaughan's arguments must have known that these claims made even less sense when applied to the grand jury, which was subject to no vicinage requirement of any sort. 28 The Whigs may have 26. For a discussion of the history and publication of this newspaper, see Thomas C. ( stating that in the late fourteenth century, "the method of the selection of the grand jury changed," and that jurors were thereafter chosen "from the body of the county" (footnote omitted)). J.M. Beattie notes that at the end of the seventeenth century, the London grand jury reasoned that what worked for the petit jury was worth positing for the grand jury as well, but this does not explain why they reached so quickly for the unpersuasive "personal knowledge" argument when they might simply have turned to Vaughan's comments about individual perception. The Conclusion examines the functions that this argument served.
ZOOK, RADICAL WHIGS AND CONSPIRATORIAL POLITICS IN LATE STUART ENGLAND

I. VAUGHAN'S ARGUMENTS IN BUSHELL'S CASE
Whatever he thought about the "personal knowledge" claim, Vaughan probably never imagined that it would come to provide a basic rationale for the jury's independence. That this aspect of his decision could be made to serve the Whigs' ends was a historical fluke. Bushell's Case arose out of an earlier case involving the prosecution of William Penn and William Mead for preaching to other Quakers in public." Vaughan's opinion thus protected the conduct of a jury sympathetic to the rights of religious dissenters, but his arguments would be adapted for the needs of a large and vocal political faction that saw itself beleaguered by a pattern of hostile prosecutions.
As a member of Parliament in the late 1660s, Vaughan had supported an unsuccessful bill forbidding judges to fine or punish jurors, 0 and shortly after he was appointed to the Court of Common Pleas, he had an opportunity to rule on the issue. Bushell's Case arose when four jurors refused to convict. Penn and Mead of seditious preaching before an unlawful assembly. 3 The Quakers, frequent targets of religious persecution under the Stuarts, had emphasized the jury's obligation to render a verdict "according to conscience," and when Penn and Mead were tried in 1670, they argued for acquittal based on freedom of conscience. Even after being locked up without food or drink, four members of the jury refused to convict; they found Penn guilty of "speaking in Gracechurch Street," 3 2 but not to an unlawful assembly, and they found Mead not guilty. When the trial judge made them redeliberate, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty included "seventeen men... chosen from the twenty-six City wards .... For the most part they were drawn from the upper ranks of the ... rate-paying population" and "were also widely experienced in other aspects of the government of the City." J.M. BEATTIE 194-215 (1986) .
32. Green, supra note 3, at 225.
for both defendants. Although the judge was forced to accept this verdict, he charged all of the jurors for returning a verdict contrary to the evidence and contrary to his instructions. They were fined forty marks 33 each and were sent to Newgate Prison until they paid. Edward Bushell and three others refused to pay the fine and remained imprisoned until Vaughan ruled on their case.
Vaughan emphasized the jury's independence throughout his opinion. His central concerns involved the legitimacy of the jury system, the problem that law and fact are not always distinct, and the importance of crediting jurors' perceptions of the evidence. First, Vaughan argued that unless the jury can act independently of the judge, it cannot command public support:
[I]f the Judge having heard the evidence... shall tell the jury... the law is for the plaintiff, or for the defendant, and you are under the pain of fine and imprisonment to find accordingly, .. . every man sees that the jury is but a troublesome delay ... and therefore the tryals by them may be better abolish'd than continued; which were a strange new-found conclusion, after a tryal so celebrated for many hundreds of years.
34
This argument speaks to the legitimacy-and indeed the very point-of the jury's decisions: If these assessments are to be trustworthy, they cannot simply be dictated by the judge. This explanation thus speaks to the public's faith in, and commitment to, the jury system as an institution. Vaughan did not draw out this implication, but later commentators noted that if judges could punish jurors for returning disobedient verdicts, few would be eager to serve on juries in the first place. 35 Second, in discussing the jurors' power to form their own conclusions, Vaughan offered a cryptic discussion that the Whigs would soon appropriate for their own ends, producing an interpretation that Vaughan almost certainly would have challenged had he anticipated it. He distinguished between special verdicts and general verdicts, noting that the latter category typically combines issues of law and fact: "[U]pon all general issues; ... though it be matter of law whether the defendant be a 33. A mark was worth two-thirds of a pound. See NICHOLAS MAYHEW, STERLING: THE RISE AND FALL OF A CURRENCY 2 (1999). Beattie has examined the composition of London juries in the 1690s; if the figures in that study apply to the 1670s, forty marks probably represented less than ten percent of most jurors' total wealth (which in many cases was above £300), but it represented at least half of the annual rental income from the real estate owned by all except the wealthiest ten percent of jurors. 38 and he remarked that if the judge, prior to hearing the verdict, were to inquire about the jury's finding of fact, a directed verdict would be appropriate'?" Vaughan' s failure to reiterate that point in his discussion of general verdicts would prove crucial, since the Whig polemicists who happened upon this passage would adopt, as a kind of mantra, the claim that juries may find both law and fact, provided that the two are so intermixed as to be inseparable. This proviso, of course, is almost infinitely flexible; in effect, it justifies any act of jury law-finding, because any jury intent on nullifying can find a way to make the case hinge on the application of law to fact. Nullification advocates quoting Vaughan's language would, in fact, soon argue that "general issues" so thoroughly dominate the jury's attention as to make jury law-finding an everyday matter.°T hird, and most crucially for the nullification debate, Vaughan was not entirely consistent about the jurors' basis for taking an independent view. Early in the opinion, Vaughan implied that no juror's conclusion can be presumed to be "against the evidence," because people disagree all the time: "I would know whether any thing be more common, than for two men students, barristers, or Judges, to deduce contrary and opposite conclusions out of the same case in law? And is there any difference that two men should inferr distinct conclusion from the same testimony. In one significant and extended passage, however, Vaughan credited the jurors not simply with a personal view of the evidence, but with personal knowledge about the case. Purporting to believe that the obsolete vicinage requirement remained an important part of the venire system, he suggested that those from the locality had better information than the judge:
Being return'd of the vicinage, whence the cause of action ariseth, the law supposeth them thence to have sufficient knowledge to try the matter... though no evidence were given on either side in Court, but to this evidence the Judge is a stranger .... They may have evidence from their own personal knowledge... that what is depos'd in Court, is absolutely false; but to this the Judge is a stranger.
43
Vaughan applied the same logic in discussing the requirement for hundredors, members of an even smaller local unit than the vicinage.' Technically, two hundredors were required to sit on juries, 4 but the requirement was not strictly enforced at this time and was eliminated a few decades later. 46 Nevertheless, Vaughan treated this provision as an important demand for local knowledge: "To what end must hundredors be of the jury, whom the law supposeth to have nearer knowledge of the fact than those of the vicinage in general?" 47 Continuing this thought two paragraphs later, he found it "absurd [that] a jury should be fined by the Judge for going against their evidence" when "the jury find" the facts "upon their own knowledge. Green finds it "unclear just how significant these arguments were for Vaughan,"" and, indeed, Vaughan might have rested his argument entirely on the claim that jurors' perceptions, however formed, deserve that minimal degree of respect that forbids a skeptical judge from imposing any punishment. On one hand, it might seem that Vaughan's purpose was more rhetorical than substantive, and that he multiplied examples simply to emphasize the futility of such punctilious requirements if the jury is merely a pawn of the judge. At the same time, these remarks about personal knowledge-a justification that Vaughan himself must have known to be outdated-are tightly interwoven with his discussion of the idiosyncratic nature of individual perception. His observation about the impossibility of using another's eyes or ears appears in the paragraph that separates his discussion of the hundredors from his remarks about the "absurd[ity]" of punishing jurors when the judge is unaware of the facts.
5
" In fact, these are the only lines in which Vaughan clearly credited the jurors with anything more than general knowledge about the local background: To have "sufficient knowledge to try the matter" or to recognize testimony as "false" may not require any awareness of the particular events under dispute, but to have superior "knowledge of the fact" is presumably to have some familiarity with those events. 51 Notably, Vaughan ascribed that heightened level of knowledge not to the "vicinage in general" but to the hundredors, whose presence on the petit jury had declined significantly in the sixteenth century 2 and who probably lacked any particular expertise in any case. 53 Conceptually, of course, the two strands of Vaughan's argument are separable. What is noteworthy, however, is that when he alternated between discussing the jurors' independent access to information and their use of their own sensory organs, Vaughan used both arguments to justify the claim that opened this section of his opinion-namely, that "the Judge, qui 49 . GREEN 
Professor Oldham notes:
By the mid-sixteenth century, it was fanciful to view the hundredor requirement as likely to produce jurymen who were "experts" in the sense of being especially knowledgeable about the facts in dispute. Arguably the requirement never had this effect, but was merely a transitional device preserving the appearance of the old jury of witnesses while the jury assumed its new role of deciding the facts based on evidence presented in court. Oldham, supra note 46, at 167. He adds that "[t]he idea that by being neighbors to the event jurors would know the facts was tenacious, finding repeated expression well into the eighteenth century." Id. at 167 n.156. Phillips and Thompson's account ascribes more credit to this part of Vaughan's analysis. See Phillips & Thompson, supra note 31, at 221 ("However anachronistic the idea of a juror's private knowledge of a case might have been by 1670, it constituted accepted legal theory at the time and continued to be a part of the law well into the next century."). If Vaughan saw nullification as an impermissible act that judges were not permitted to prevent, however, the Whigs who availed themselves of his opinion viewed Bushell's Case as a defense of nullification. Moreover, they often applied its holding to the grand jury, which was drawn from the entire county and included no vicinage requirement of any sort. The Tories would challenge them for equating the grand and petit juries, but because the Whig polemicists overstated their case in this manner, they seem to have prevailed with the seemingly milder, but equally dubious, defense of nullification by petit juries. If the Whigs had never sought to defend grand jury nullification in the first place, the Tories might have had the rhetorical leverage to oppose the "personal knowledge" claim more generally, and thus to attack the suggestion that Bushell's Case created a right to nullify. By overreaching, the Whigs apparently forestalled the perfectly reasonable objection that petit jurors had no more access to local information than did grand jurors.
II. RESTORATION POLITICS AND PRINT
Bushell's Case would probably have received little attention during the later seventeenth century if Vaughan's Reports had not been published at the outset of a particularly volatile period in English political history. Taken together, the Popish Plot and the Exclusion Crisis, accompanied by the birth of modem party politics, produced the fodder for a series of extended national conflicts, and the lapse of the Licensing Act provided the means to keep them before the public eye. These controversies, fueled in large part by anti-Catholic sentiment, were both a symptom and a cause of the political instability that would ultimately lead to the Glorious Revolution of 1688-1689, in which James was deposed in favor of his daughter Mary and her husband, William of Orange, both of whom were Protestant. When Titus Oates, an expelled Catholic seminarian, claimed in 1678 to have discovered evidence of a "Popish Plot" to burn London, assassinate the King, and take control of the government, he initiated six years of hysteria that ended only with his own arrest and imprisonment in 1684."
5 The resulting intensification of anti-Catholic hostility helped bring about a two-54. Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1012 (C.P. 1670). 55. For a discussion of these events, see KENYON, supra note 23. year legislative struggle concerning James's succession to the throne; shortly after the crisis began in 1679, the so-called exclusionists, led by the Earl of Shaftesbury, became identified as the Whig party, and their opponents, who supported Charles's court and the government, were identified as Tories. The derivations of these names give some indication of the level to which political debate had descended: "Whig" was an insult applied to horse thieves, while "Tory" was an Irish term for Catholic outlaws.
The elimination of preprint censorship was one of the crucial conditions for the continuation of political controversy and the debate over the meaning of Bushell's Case. Prior to 1679, publishing was regulated by the Licensing Act, 56 first passed in 1662 and renewed periodically thereafter. That statute, a latter-day version of the press controls maintained by the English Crown since the 1550s, 59. Thc Whigs extended the debate over licensing in Commons in order to introduce evidence that the system had fostered the publication of pro-Catholic books while preventing the publication of Protestant works. See 9 H.C. JOUR. 600 (1679); Hamburger, supra note 56, at 683. Hamburger notes that the Whigs may have hoped that the delay would provide additional time for passage of the Exclusion Bill, and he suggests that the Licensing Act's lapse was an inadvertent result of these other maneuvers. See Hamburger, supra note 56, at 683 (finding '"no evidence that any members of Parliament wished to abolish censorship altogether"). There was some active opposition, however, to the Act's renewal. See PHILOPATRIS, A JUST VINDICATION OF LEARNING 3-4 (London, 1679) (noting that "the late Act which laid that severe restraint upon Printing, is ... forestalled their efforts by adjourning Parliament prematurely, and, as a consequence, the government lost its most effective means of censorship, resulting in what one historian describes as an "explosion in the production of pamphlets, broadsheets, and periodicals such as had not been seen since the heady days of the 1640s.
' ' 60 Thus, in solving one political problem, Charles created another: By lifting the regulations associated with more than a century of prepublication censorship, he unleashed the restraints that might otherwise have controlled political debate in the print marketplace, and the government was left with the comparatively ineffectual alternative of attempting to prosecute the authors and booksellers for books that had already begun to circulate.
6 '
III. THE SEDITIOUS LIBEL PROSECUTIONS OF 1679-1680
The debate over Bushell's Case began as the result of a series of concerted attacks by Charles's government against the Whig political press in 1679-1680. The first effort to interpret and publicize Vaughan's opinion in the pamphlet literature was John Hawles's The English-Mans Right, 62 published several months after the successful prosecution of the Whig bookseller Benjamin Harris in February 1680. Hawles, a lawyer who would later become Solicitor General under William and Mary, focused specifically on the petit jury and devoted nearly twenty pages to Bushell's Case. Although he mentioned the argument that jurors are entitled to form their own opinions, he gave much more space to the "personal knowledge" argument; his care in reviewing it, at this early date, probably helped it to achieve the popularity it would gain a year later, when other commentators joined the debate. The prosecutions continued through the end of 1680, but near Expiring," and calling "Liberty of the Press" the surest means of combating "Popish Villanies" (emphasis altered)); see also SCHWOERER, supra note 56, at 16 (arguing that the lapse "was not the result of mindless inattentiveness" and that "interest in press control was widespread in the spring of 1679"). There is some uncertainty about when the Licensing Act lapsed. See KNIGHTS, supra note 22, at 156 n.15 (citing conflicting authorities giving either March 13 or June 10 as the date of expiration). 
JOHN HAWLES, THE ENGLISH-MANS RIGHT (London, Richard Janeway 1680); see also
GREEN, supra note 3, at 252 (noting that Hawles's pamphlet was inspired by Harris's prosecution). Green, however, places in this category not only the writings of John Hawles, but also Henry Care's pamphlet, English Liberties, which Green also dates to 1680. Id. at 252 n.207. Care's pamphlet, which bears no date on its title page, was actually published in 1682. For a discussion of this pamphlet and its dating, see infra note 160.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal after another successful case in July 1680, the grand juries became less cooperative. In September, three prosecutions were halted by findings of ignoramus, and the following month, Hawles published a pamphlet, The Grand-Jury-Man's Oath and Office Explained, which discussed the rights of grand jurors. 63 There, rather than pursuing the "personal knowledge" argument, Hawles emphasized the grand jurors' obligation to scrutinize the evidence carefully rather than merely rubber-stamping it. Significantly, even while repeating the point that judges may not fine the jurors, Hawles also acknowledged the jury's obligation to follow the judge's directions on matters of law.' It appears that the only other contribution to the nullification debate at this stage was a leaflet, printed by Benjamin Harris, that posed a series of rhetorical questions that functioned as a kind of checklist of concerns that nullifying jurors might invoke. This leaflet adapted several of Hawles's arguments and indicates the popularity that they would acquire as the debate gained steam.
"
A. Harris's Trial and Hawles's Celebration of Bushell's Case
The government effort to control the Whig press began in the autumn of 1679, when three booksellers were arrested and jailed to await trial early the following year. 66 The trial of Benjamin Harris set the stage for the jury nullification arguments that would provoke extensive debate during the later phases of the Popish Plot. On February 5, in "the first political trial of 1680," 67 Harris was tried before Lord Chief Justice Scroggs for publishing The dating of A Short, but Just Account depends on evidence from the collection of Narcissus Luttrell, an antiquarian, book collector, and member of Commons, who recorded the date of publication of each book or pamphlet he acquired after January 1, 1680. The pamphlet bears the date 1679 on its title page, but Luttrell's copy is dated "7 Febr. 1679/80." STEPHEN PARKS, THE LUTTRELL FILE: NARCISSUS LUTrRELL'S DATES ON CONTEMPORARY PAMPHLETS 1678-1730, at 161 (1999). At that time, the new year began on March 25 (Lady Day), and to avoid confusion, dates between January 1 and March 24 were sometimes recorded by indicating both years, under the "Old Style" or "Lady Day dating." For evidence that Luttrell was recording the date of publication, see James M. Osborn, Reflections on Narcissus Luttrell (1657-1732), 6 BOOK COLLECTOR 15 (1957), reprinted in PARKS, supra, at 1. But see KNIGHTS, supra note 22, at 376 (arguing that in some instances, Luttrell recorded the date of purchase rather than the date of publication); Knott, supra, at 197-98 (noting that Luttrell's notations are more likely to be accurate when they specify a particular date rather than a month). Besides listing the dates Luttrell a pro-exclusionist pamphlet, An Appeal from the Country to the City, 68 which opposed James's succession and endorsed the King's illegitimate (but Protestant) son, the Duke of Monmouth. The jury sought to save Harris by returning a special verdict, "guilty of selling the book," but when directed to return with an unambiguous verdict of guilty or not, they found Harris guilty. 69 He was sentenced to stand in the pillory and to pay a fine of £500. This hypothetical provides the model for numerous examples that would follow in later pamphlets on the jury's power. In illustrating the merger of law and fact, commentators would frequently propose an example in which the prosecution is framed by welding a malicious or seditious intent to an innocent act (such as publishing the Bible 78 ), and would then ask whether anyone could return a guilty verdict in such a case.
This tactic amounts to an argument for nullification rather than the more limited capacity for jury independence that Vaughan had defended. As noted above, Vaughan never allowed that the jury may rule against its own view of the evidence. Hawles, however, would ask the jury to weigh the legal basis for the indictment itself, and to reject the policy if they found it offensive. Tellingly, the proponents of nullification often proceeded by invoking the "personal knowledge" claim as a later step in the argument rather than simply asserting that the libel prosecutions were illegitimate. This pattern, often repeated in the literature, makes the claim for local knowledge appear particularly specious, hence raising questions about the function it served. Hawles usefully provides an early example of this strategy.
Although Hawles went beyond Vaughan's argument for jury independence, The English-Mans Right otherwise tacks closely to Vaughan's opinion, most significantly by focusing on the same jury that figured in Bushell's Case-the petit jury. Hawles never stopped to explain this decision; he probably never thought to explain it since Harris's case, like Bushell's, turned on the verdict of a petit jury. On the question of the jurors' personal knowledge, Hawles's barrister remarks that the defendant's "neighbours (who consequently cannot be presumed to be unacquainted either with the matters charged, the Prisoner's course of life, or the credit of the Evidence) must first be fully satisfied in their Consciences, that he is guilty." '79 The discussion of Bushell's Case itself forms a significant part of the pamphlet. Hawles introduced the case halfway through his dialogue, and the discussion takes up most of the remainder of the tract, turning the dialogue into a monologue by the barrister. Hawles's first reference to the case is also his most dramatic: When the juryman worries that a disobedient verdict might result in a fine that would "utterly ruin ones Family," the barrister declares, in the pamphlet's only typographical shift into a gothic, black-letter font, that "there is never a judge in England that can Comment thereupon."). Hawles's characterization is not entirely accurate: Littleton states that in those cases in which the jury "'may give their verdict at large, if they will take upon them the knowledge of the law upon the matter, they may give their verdict generally."' 2 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 228a (Charles Butler ed., London, J. & W.T. Clarke 18th ed. 1823) (1628) (quoting Littleton). In his commentary on this passage, Coke observed that "it is dangerous for them so to doe, for if they doe mistake the law, they runne into danger of an attaint; therefore to find the speciall matter [i.e., a special verdict] is the safest way where the case is doubtfull." Id. " Relying on a new view of the King's authority to control the press in the absence of statutory regulation, Scroggs helped the jury reach a guilty verdict by instructing them that Care's guilt hinged not on the presence of malicious intent, but on whether he had published the pamphlet without having it licensed.
9 ' Despite being found guilty, however, Care was not 
B. The Rise of Ignoramus and Hawles's Second Pamphlet
Care's trial did not immediately provoke further discussion of jury nullification, but it was soon followed by the first set of ignoramus bills, returned by grand juries in September 1680. Three booksellers-Francis Smith, Langley Curtis, and David Mallett-were prosecuted for seditious libel in September, and all three prosecutions were halted by ignoramus bills. 95 Smith, the first to be prosecuted, appeared before Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys on September 16, 1680,96 and was charged on the basis of a pamphlet recommending that the Lord Mayor of London limit his expenses for public feasts. 97 The charge was dismissed three times successively by the same grand jury, whose presentments Jeffreys effaced twice before abandoning that tactic and calling Smith into court to demand a confession. 98 . is an almost certain guarantee that that imprint is ... a misleading one and that the work on which it appears was actually published (in our modem sense) by someone else"). Hence both of Hawles's pamphlets may actually have been published by another, unnamed member of the bookselling industry. grand jury as a separate institution, Hawles observed a distinction that would be ignored a year later by the Whig polemicists defending the grand juries' ignoramus bills in the treason cases. Even in its abbreviated form, however, the defense of jury independence in The Grand-Jury-Man's Oath addresses several topics that would resurface frequently in later treatments of nullification. Thus, for example, Hawles focused on the part of the juror's oath stating that he will "diligently Inquire and true Presentment' make," explaining that jurors are thereby instructed "to Enquire, and that diligently, not to be slothful, or negligent, not to take things upon Trust, or hurry them over carelessly" --an explanation that other commentators would repeat almost verbatim."
5 On the other hand, in quoting the oath's demand that jurors "Present the Truth, the whole Truth, and nothing but the Truth," 106 Hawles associated this pledge with a probable cause requirement, describing a lower proof standard than one would expect to find in a robust argument for nullification: "They [the grand jurors].., cannot be intended to give in more than a verisimilary or probable Charge; which by what they have heard, they do aver upon their Oaths, does seem to them to be Just and true, and fit for Justice to take Cognizance of."' 07 The grand jurors' bill, Hawles explained, "denotes not an absolute Certainty, but so as things appear." 109 Most of the pamphlet, however, is devoted to the law/fact distinction, centering on the example of seditious libel. Hawles complained that in libel prosecutions, language about intent is often "thrust in to raise a pretence or colour of Crime, where there is really none." 109 Hawles formulated this argument only in skeletal form: Far from suggesting that law and fact are typically so intertwined as to become equally matters of jury discretion, he reserved that principle for a limited set of cases, acknowledging that where the law, by a "Just and reasonable implication," defines an act as the effect of malicious intent, the grand jury is "bound" to find intent where it finds the act, even where no "direct proof' has been offered to establish intent.' Hawles treated this view as uncontroversial, but it would not meet with such ready assent among later commentators. 12 Evidently written in anticipation of further seditious libel prosecutions, The Grand-Jury-Man's Oath is interesting in part because of the modesty of its claims: It does not purport to provide a genealogy of the "ancient" rights of juries, nor does it recommend nullification as a general remedy available for most cases. Moreover, Hawles made no effort to credit the grand jury with any personal knowledge about the cases it hears. To say that the jurors can "present... the whole Truth" by judging a charge to be "verisimilary or probable," rather than by determining its absolute truth, is to raise the possibility that they may lack access to the evidence that would allow for a higher proof standard.
Hawles's tract seems to have provoked little immediate response, but among the few who did take up the question was Benjamin Harris. In late November, evidently heartened by the turn of events in the fall, Harris printed a leaflet advocating jury nullification, titled with the particulars in the Indictment or Information." 5 In contemplating an actively resistant jury, the author indicated the path that later commentators would take. The leaflet ends by addressing the legitimacy of judges' behavior, asking whether they are not required to compare the Facts of the Indicted person with the Laws, and to make it plain to the Jury and all that come to see Justice done, that the person Indicted is not falsly but truly Indicted, respecting the matter of Fact... that so if the person be found guilty by the Jury, he may be convinced in his own Conscience that his Judgment is just, as also that those which hear may be Informed and fear to Transgress?" 6 Without spelling out a remedy for the jury to adopt in the absence of such an open and well-grounded prosecution, the leaflet seems to hint that nullification is an appropriate response to the appearance of arbitrariness. In a short work, simply designed to be provocative, one would hardly expect to find a fully elaborated account of this theory. The leaflet suggests, however, that jurors are entitled not only to have the law made clear to them, but also to be persuaded of its basis and validity. The judge himself thus resembles a witness whose testimony is subject to sifting and probing by jurors who are free to reject it if they find it inadequate. Although the argument for legitimacy appears here only fleetingly, it targets an aspect of jury nullification that would receive more attention as the debate continued.
IV. THE 1681 TREASON TRIALS
The next set of arguments concerning jury nullification erupted around the trial of Stephen Colledge. Charged with treason, Colledge was exonerated when a London grand jury returned an ignoramus bill in June 1681-an action that the Tory polemicists had anticipated and that brought the discussion of Bushell's Case to a new level. Although Roger L'Estrange was not the only Tory journalist to be outraged by the decision, he was particularly vocal in his criticism, which provoked Colledge's Whig supporters to respond in kind. Near the end of the year, two of the other alleged conspirators against the King-John Rouse and the Earl of Shaftesbury-were also spared by ignoramus bills. Between the summer of 1681 and the fall of 1682, the Whigs worked intensively to exploit Hawles's arguments and to develop new ones in favor of jury nullification. Although the "personal knowledge" argument figured prominently in these 115. TWENTY FOUR SOBER QUERIES, supra note 113, at 1. 116. Id. at 2.
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The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 111: 1815 writings, the Whigs also treated the merger of law and fact as a common occurrence and argued that, while judges were political appointees who needed to please the Crown in order to stay in office, juries had no such political dependencies." 7 In adapting and expanding on Hawles's arguments, these polemicists crafted a defense of nullification that would become highly influential; two of the treatises produced during this phase of the debate-one by John Somers and one by Henry Care-went through several reprints in England and the American colonies during the next century and helped preserve the vicinage argument into the late eighteenth century.
A. The Trial of Stephen Colledge and the Tory Response
To understand the context in which the nullification debate escalated, it is useful to begin with an overview of the political conflict during the spring and summer of 1681. another paper that railed constantly against the ignoramus juries by expressing mock astonishment at the flexibility of the term "conscience" in the Whigs' mouths. 135 When these polemicists addressed the policy arguments concerning nullification, they turned most readily to the distinction between the petit and grand juries, and emphasized the different competences that Hawles, if not Harris, also observed: Grand juries, according to these Tory journalists, have no charge to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses they hear.'
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In one instance, however, L'Estrange specifically attacked the policy underlying the theory that law and fact are inseparable. After making his Whig complain that when malicious intent forms part of the indictment, "a Person might come to be Condemn'd for the most innocent fact in the world," L'Estrange responded with a policy argument that, for him, demonstrated that juries should never be trusted to evaluate intent: "It is the Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal together, the judge may decide both. The policy argument, of course, is equally troubling on either side, insofar as it simply withdraws control from one of the authorities in the trial rather than seeking to divide the power. What L'Estrange accurately registered, however, is the problem that the "exception" for jury law-finding quickly becomes a general license. More generally, this argument also illustrates the lack of subtlety in his attacks on nullification. To seek carefully thought-out anti-nullification arguments in the Observator is a mistake: L'Estrange was concerned primarily with discrediting his Whig opponents, and only secondarily with the theories on which they relied. Although he occasionally considered the broader implications of their arguments, his paper contributed most saliently to the debate simply by forcing the opposition to clarify its arguments.
B. The Whig Defense of Nullification
One of the commentators who took up L'Estrange's challenge was the author of the anonymous pamphlet The Power and Privilege of Juries Asserted, 3 s whose sub-subtitle (Published for the Information of Heraclytus Ridens, and the Doting Observator) indicates the motive for its publication. Unlike Hawles, the author focused mainly on the fairness of allowing jurors to act according to their consciences. Thus, the author argued that to deny jurors the ability to nullify would turn them into much more reluctant participants, harming the jury system itself:
It puts Juries upon these Dilemma's either to serve or not to serve[;] if they refuse to serve, they lose Issues, and are punished that way: if they do serve, then they must find according to their Consciences or not: if according to their Consciences, then they offend the Judg, if it be against his Direction, and such Evidence as seems so to him, and so they incur Fine, Imprisonment, and consequently Death, Temporal Punishments: If not according to their Consciences, then they offend God, and incur Punishments both Temporal and Eternal. The pamphlet also emphasizes the symmetry between judges and jurors: "Juries are as ancient as Judges, and ... the same Law that ordained both Judges and Juries gave them divisum imperium, a divided Authority, and 138. THE POWER AND PRIVILEGE OF JURIES ASSERTED (London, Richard Janeway 1681). The pamphlet was probably published in June or July; Rawlins mentioned it in an attack on Janeway published in late July. See [Edward Rawlins], HERACLITUS RIDENS, July 26, 1681, at 2.
139. THE POWER AND PRIVILEGE OF JURIES ASSERTED, supra note 138, at 3-4. Hawles made an analogous argument, without developing the policy implications, in The English-Mans Right, where the juror hopes to avoid jury duty because "there sometimes happen [to be] nice cases, wherein it may be difficult to discharge ones conscience without incurring the displeasure of the Court, and thence trouble and damage may arise." HAWLES, supra note 62, at 2. therefore whoever takes away the Authority of Juries, takes away the Authority of the Judge... ." " When the question of jurors' personal knowledge arises, that sense of divided authority returns. Insisting that the juror should "proceed according to his evidence, Id est, his own knowledge," rather than "the external evidence or swearing of the witnesses," the author remarks that "Judges doe... determine the pertinency of Evidence" but are not permitted to determine "what credence [the jury] will give to it." "s' The argument about power-sharing might simply be taken to repeat Vaughan's point about legitimacy-to undermine the jurors' authority is to undermine faith in the whole system-but the author seems to have wanted to claim for jurors an authority not shared with the judge, an authority that may trump that of the judge. By the beginning of the following year, the trials of Colledge, Rouse, and Shaftesbury had also provoked a spate of less innovative arguments for nullification, which often took the same form as Hawles's The EnglishMans Right. These commentators typically imagined defendants harassed by malicious prosecutions, but then turned away from the attack on unjust laws to catalogue the other bases for jurors' refusal to be guided by the judge-bases such as the vicinage requirement and its attendant guarantee of a superior information base. This rhetorical structure is exemplified unusually crisply in a short pamphlet that also illustrates the disappearance, among the Whig polemicists, of any distinction between the petit and grand juries' duties. Probably published early in 1682, Ignoramus Vindicated, in a Dialogue Between Prejudice and Indifference 142 begins with an explicit and by this time routine assertion of the jury's law-finding power. Invoking the slogan that "the Law arises out of, and is complicated with the Fact," the author, speaking through his mouthpiece "Indifference," defended the jury's prerogative to "refuse... to find Bills, though there be Positive Oaths before them," because the jurors "are Judges (in some respect) as of Law, as well of Fact." 143 At first, "Indifference" says nothing about the jurors' personal knowledge of the defendant, but instead attacks politically motivated prosecutions:
[S]uppose a Man should be Indicted of 145 This would seem precisely the place to press the analogy and to challenge the legality of those prosecutions, but instead "Indifference" takes a new tack and affirms that "the Law supposes the Jury to know more of the Witnesses than the Court does." " That answer, which the author elaborated at length, epitomizes not only a widely shared reluctance to accept the law-finding label, which is all the more striking because the author had just advocated it so directly, but also an extension to the grand jury of the petit jury's access to local information. That latter move, too, is typical of the pro-nullification pamphlets issued around this time: Vaughan's arguments were being extended wholesale to both juries.
The same pattern is evident in John Somers's The Security of EnglishMens Lives,' 47 which was published around the same time and went on to become one of the most popular defenses of the jury in England and America during the following century. The treatise opens with a rant against the "corrupt Ministers of State... who might commit the most odious of Murders in the form and course of Justice... by corrupting of Judges, as dependant upon them for their Honour and great Revenue." 14' Cataloguing the many recent "Forgeries, Perjuries, Subomations, and Combinations of infamous Wretches... to defame Loyal, Innocent Protestants, and to shed their guiltless Blood in the Form and Course of 144. Id. at 2. 145. Id. "[T]he late Cases" probably refers to the trials of Colledge, Rouse, and Shaftesbury; these media events provoked much more controversy than did the trials of Smith, Curtis, and Mallett in September 1680. In any case, the author could not have been referring to the trials of Harris and Care, since the juries in those cases did not return ignoramus verdicts.
146. Id. at 5.
[JOHN SOMERS), THE SECURITY OF ENGLISH-MENS LIVES (London, T. Mitchel [1682]
). The first edition bears a publication date of 1681; however, the treatise presents a defense of the grand jury's ignoramus verdict at Shaftesbury's trial, on November 24, 1681. Given its lengthnearly 230 pages-the book probably took more than five weeks to complete and print. Therefore, under the "Old Style" system of dating, see supra note 67, it was probably published between January and March 1682. The book was published anonymously; for the attribution to Somers, see 148. SOMERS, supra note 147, at 7.
Justice," Somers declared that "Grand Juries are our only Security."' 4 9
They can be trusted, he argued, because they The Guide also illustrates another theme that was beginning to receive greater emphasis in the nullification literature: the suggestion that the jury's size lends legitimacy to its decisions. This claim had long been familiar in arguments concerning the advantages of the jury system, but around the time of the treason cases, a sense emerged that the jury's size might also lend legitimacy to the decision to nullify. This argument may also be found in a pamphlet published around the same time, entitled A Discourse Touching the Addresses or Presentments to the King Against the Association.' 58 After reprinting the grand juror's oath and running through the vicinage requirement, the author paused to remark that the jurors, "being many, can see further into a matter, than one single person, and being upon their Oaths, must Act without favor or affection to either side: as perchance other persons which judg that the Verdict should be otherwise, may be some way or other prejudiced against the Person Charged." 159 The author did not draw what might seem the obvious corollary: that twelve people (or more, in the case of a grand jury) are also better qualified to find law than a single person, because any prejudice that colors a judge's view of the facts might also influence his perception of the law.
Indeed, this argument did not appear explicitly in the pamphlet literature, but it is implicit in Henry Care's argument in his 1682 treatise English Liberties," 6 which looks closely at the relation between jury nullification and legitimacy. Care's paean to the English jury constitutes the book's final section, comprising some twenty-five pages. Care stressed the dangers of concentrating power in a single, unaccountable decisionmaker throughout this section: Care also argued for the parity of authority divided between judge and jury, arguing that the jurors were originally viewed as "Associates and Assistants to the Judges of the Court in a kind of Equality." 167 At the same time, Care sought to rein in the judge's power by insisting that "the Jury are the proper and only Judges" of the evidence, and that "the Judge has nothing to do to Intermeddle, he is bound by their Verdict." 1 Finally, Care also intensified a number of the arguments that were, by now, familiar among members of his camp. He called it a matter of "every dayes" practice for jurors to "apply[] matter of Fact and Law together," because in "most General Issues" such as trespass and breach of peace, the jurors 70 but also quoted at length from Vaughan's remarks about the differences in individual perception and reasoning.' 7 ' In fact, Care devoted the last four pages of his book to a synopsis of Bushell's Case and quoted more of it than any of his contemporaries."' If Care did not spell out the policy implications of his argument concerning the jury's role as a check on the judge, his comments on arbitrariness and prejudice strongly hinted that the jury is properly credited with a routine fact-finding power that rivals the power of the judge. That he did not argue this point directly is significant, but of all the nullification advocates, Care was the one who came closest to asserting the jury's superior competence in all aspects of trial administration-perhaps because of his own experiences. Like Hawles's pamphlet, Care's treatise would prove to be extremely durable: It went through four English editions in the next twenty years, and then was reprinted in North America.
173
This eruption of pro-nullification literature encountered surprisingly little rebuttal, and the response it did engender consisted, for the most part, of diatribes like L'Estrange's, which simply criticized the ignoramus juries as shamelessly partisan without exploring the theory of nullification. One response that targeted the policy issues directly, however, was the 1682 pamphlet 177 It is unclear why Womock refrained from disputing the petit jury's competence; perhaps he considered it irrelevant, since the nullification cases revolved entirely around grand juries. In taking such care to limit his remarks about "ubiquitaries" to the grand jury, however, Womock revealed how much authority the Whig interpretation of Vaughan's opinion had already acquired.
V. THE EXPORT OF THE NULLIFICATION ARGUMENTS TO AMERICA
Vaughan's use of the "personal knowledge" claim clearly proved useful for the advocates of nullification. As we have seen, many commentators simply copied Vaughan in drawing the connection between the institutional process originally used for selecting juries and the presumption that jurors knew more than judges about the facts of the case. During the eighteenth century, these arguments were taken up on the other side of the Atlantic, only to disappear in the years after the ratification of the Constitution. Indeed, from the time of the Revolutionary War, the rhetorical linkage between the vicinage requirement and the jury's independence seems to have lost its linchpin. Proponents of the requirement turned to claims about the jurors' familiarity with the defendant's character or to entirely separate justifications, such as neutrality and administrative efficiency. At the same time, advocates of jury independence began to focus on the need for a check on the judiciary and the importance of respecting jurors' personal judgments. Although it still appeared 176. Id. at 12. 177. Id. at 12-13. occasionally, the popular refrain of the 1680s, which emphasized the jury's knowledge about the facts of the case, was slowly fading away.
Care's English Liberties was reprinted in Boston in 1721 by Benjamin Franklin's half-brother,' s and Franklin himself advertised copies for sale in his newspaper, the Pennsylvania Gazette, in 1734.1 79 The following year, during John Peter Zenger's famous libel trial, his lawyer, Andrew Hamilton, told the jurors that they had the power to reach a decision based on their presumptively superior knowledge about the case: "The law supposes you to be summoned out of the neighbourhood where the fact is alleged to be committed; and the reason of your being taken out of the neighbourhood is, because you are supposed to have the best knowledge of the fact that is to be tried." 80 The episode is reminiscent of the 1680 libel trials: Zenger, charged with libeling the much-hated Royal Governor of New York, was quickly acquitted by a jury who shared his political views. During the preceding thirty years, however, English courts had begun to require that jurors with personal knowledge about the case be sworn as witnesses, 8 ' and shortly after Zenger's case, the rule was established in England that if a juror failed to follow that procedure, the defendant was entitled to a new trial."12 By the time Blackstone published his Commentaries in the late 1760s, he could affirm that "the practice... now universally obtains, that if a juror knows any thing of the matter in issue, he may be sworn as a witness, and give his evidence publicly in court." ' Around "personal knowledge" argument during the 1770s and 1780s. In a 1774 address concerning the rights of Englishmen, the Continental Congress celebrated the "great right ... of trial by jury [,] [which] provides, that neither life, liberty nor property, can be taken from the possessor, [without the approval of] twelve of his unexceptionable countrymen and peers of his vicinage, who from that neighbourhood may reasonably be supposed to be acquainted with his character." "' In a notable substitution that would gain more support in the following years, this justification credits the jurors with some general acquaintance of the defendant, rather than with the more specifically relevant information about the case itself that earlier nullification advocates had emphasized.
Disagreement over a vicinage requirement for criminal defendants fueled an extended controversy during the constitutional ratification debates in the late 1780s. 86 Although the Federalists generally opposed the requirement, the Anti-Federalists justified it by invoking such considerations as speed, ease of assembling evidence, and, in a few cases, the jury's superior knowledge base. Abraham Holmes of Massachusetts argued that the requirement would give the jury "an opportunity to form a judgment of the character of the person charged with the crime, and also to judge of the credibility of the witnesses." " Joseph M'Dowall of North Carolina and James Wilson of Pennsylvania echoed this view. 188 The
Virginia delegates canvassed the issue more extensively. Patrick Henry, citing the "immemorial practice of [our] British ancestors" under which "a number of hundredors were required on a jury," insisted on the criminal defendant's right to "an impartial jury of the vicinage, acquainted with his character and the circumstances of fact." '9 George Mason defended the "impartial jury of the vicinage" as a "great palladium of national safety," because it guaranteed that the defendant would be judged by "his character and reputation." "' In response, Edmund Pendleton noted that a jury of the vicinage would not necessarily "be acquainted with the personal character of the person accused," ' 91 since the requirement targeted the locality of the crime, not the defendant's neighborhood. Pendleton argued instead that they would "have some personal knowledge of the fact, and acquaintance with the witnesses, who will come from the neighborhood." 192 In spite of Pendleton's remarks, Mason's more diffuse claim about the jurors' knowledge was beginning to displace its predecessor-when any such claim was made at all. Indeed, Pendleton's very apt criticism helps to show that the emergent character-based argument was not only weaker than the original argument from personal knowledge but was even more implausible, since it addressed a concern that bears no direct relation to vicinage. That commentators were abandoning the former argument for the latter, then, may indicate the extent of their growing uneasiness with the former. The character-based argument was merely a way station on the road between the arguments of the 1680s and the modern defense of jury independence.
Just as proponents of the vicinage requirement were turning to other justifications, proponents of jury independence were also beginning to look elsewhere. When collecting authorities on the subject in 1771, John Adams included a number of seventeenth-century decisions, including Bushell's Case, which indicated that "a Jury may give a Verdict on their own Knowledge ... without being sworn as Witnesses," ' 93 but he ignored that argument a month later when he pillaged his fragmentary notes to produce a short essay on the jury's independence. Instead of discussing the jurors' personal knowledge, Adams 95 but instead of referring to the jurors' knowledge, Jefferson justified their lawfinding powers by emphasizing the problem of judicial bias:
[P]ermanent judges ... are misled by favor, by relationship, by a spirit of party, by a devotion to the Executive or Legislative .... It is left therefore to the juries, if they think the permanent judges are under any biass whatever in any cause, to take upon themselves to judge the law as well as the fact.
96
Although these later eighteenth-century thinkers clearly had access to the "personal knowledge" argument that had been so energetically developed by the Whigs in the early 1680s, it apparently held little appeal for them.
Indeed, this argument would soon be expressly rejected by the judges who considered it. In an 1804 prosecution against newspaper publisher Harry Croswell for libeling Jefferson, 97 Justice James Kent of the New York Supreme Court was confronted with the question whether the court could instruct the jury on the question of malicious intent or whether the jury could reach its own conclusions, even if intent was an inference of law. Kent surveyed a number of decisions, including Bushell's Case, 198 and while he praised Vaughan's "learned and profound argument," '9 Kent did not discuss Vaughan's analysis but instead emphasized the jurors' obligation to "exercise their own judgments on the matter in issue, with discretion and integrity." 00 Chief Justice Morgan Lewis argued that the judge could instruct the jury when the law inferred intent from certain actions, and after examining Bushell's Case more closely, he rejected Vaughan's suggestion that judges could not state the law in cases involving general verdicts. Lewis's analysis turns, in part, on his dissatisfaction with Vaughan's claims about the jurors' independent knowledge:
[Vaughan] ... assigns, as a reason why a jury is not justifiable for a false verdict, that the judge cannot know their evidence, for their verdict may be the result of their own knowledge of the fact, or such knowledge derived from each other. Surely, at this day, such doctrine is inadmissible, and destroys the authority of this case.
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Lewis offered no explanation for the "inadmissib[ility]" of Vaughan's argument; the developments of the previous century presumably rendered that conclusion self-evident.
By 1855, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court could simply ignore the "independent knowledge" aspect of Vaughan's opinion when ruling on the permissibility of jury law-finding. In Commonwealth v. Anthes, 0 ' which tested the legality of a statute giving the jury the right to find law, Shaw explained that Bushell's Case indicates that "[the jury] cannot be punished for finding against law," 2 03 but he added that
Vaughan's opinion "clearly implies that the judge, within his appropriate sphere, is... to adjudge all questions of law, and direct the jury thereon."'24 In considering the jury's law-finding power when rendering a general verdict, Shaw rejected Vaughan's conclusion that a juror "must find his verdict upon his own conviction and conscience."2Q" Shaw completely ignored the argument that the jury might have independent access to information about the case; instead, he focused on Vaughan's observation that "'[a] man cannot... infer the thing to be resolved by another's understanding or reasoning.' '06 That proposition, Shaw argued, was irrelevant when "applied to the whole issue embraced in a general verdict," 2 " 7 because in such a case, the jury must accept the judge's instructions concerning legally specified inferences. That Shaw saw no reason even to mention the "personal knowledge" argument is notable. Lewis, writing in 1804, had found the argument "inadmissible"; a halfcentury later it apparently had so little force as not even to be worth rebutting." 8 Shaw's account of Bushell's Case is the one that is preserved in Supreme Court case law. In the 1895 case of Sparf v. United States, 2°9 the first Justice Harlan ruled that juries have the power, but not the right, to find law; in considering the relevance of Bushell's Case, he quoted directly from Justice Shaw's observations, which are quoted above. 210 Sparf involved an appeal by two sailors who had been convicted of killing a shipmate. The appellants objected to an instruction by the trial judge that the jury could not take on a law-finding function by returning a verdict of manslaughter, but must find the accused either guilty or not guilty of murder. Harlan held that the jury was limited to finding the facts, and must follow the court's instructions concerning the law. Those who appeared to defend the contrary result, Harlan argued, had been concerned only with the limited set of cases involving "a general verdict, ... [which] disposes of the case at hand, both as to law and fact." ' ' After quoting from Somers's The Security of EnglishMens Lives to make this point, 212 Harlan turned to Bushell's Case and Shaw's comments on it, and then underscored the limited scope of Vaughan's opinion: "[T]he leading thought in the opinion of Chief Justice Vaughan was that while the jury cannot answer as to the law, nor the court attack as "personal." Thus, the Whigs' claims about personal knowledge may capture a sense that the jurors had a privileged understanding of the defendant's plight, even though the seventeen members of Colledge's London grand jury were most unlikely to know anything about the facts of his case. The "personal knowledge" claim also served a rhetorical purpose. Those who wanted to encourage nullification sought to ground the jury's conduct in an authority commensurate with that of the judge. Specifying an independent source of information allowed these advocates to find a means of counterbalancing the witnesses who testified under oath on behalf of the government. By placing the jurors on the same level as the judge, this claim also validated the assertion that juries may find law as well as fact. To justify nullification by invoking a superior knowledge base is to combat the arbitrary administration of justice with a weapon that suits the law's internal account of legitimate decisionmaking.
2 1 8 The imputation that the seditious libel and treason prosecutions were illegitimate pervades the pamphlet literature, from the hypothetical examples in The English-Mans Right and Ignoramus Vindicated, to Harris's complaint about judges who conceal the legal basis of their rulings, to Care's remarks about biased judges who must be checked by a large and impartial jury. Although it might be sufficient to say that resistance is always an appropriate response to the abuse of power, the further suggestion that juries were hewing to principle in the face of an arbitrary judiciary seems to have been irresistible. As we have seen, this argument emerged as the nullification debate continued, and was reflected in Jefferson's later defense of jury independence." 9 Neither of these purposes would have been served by emphasizing the jurors' right to judge according to their own perceptions. This argument, readily cast in terms of idiosyncrasy and eccentricity, would not have communicated the sense of personal conviction and empathy implicit in the "personal knowledge" argument, and it would have lacked the rhetorical weight to compete with the judge's authority. Further, in emphasizing an entirely subjective standard, such claims might have provoked more of the ridicule that the Tories directed at Colledge's London jury. 218. Womock responded to the argument that the jury was entitled to the same degree of authority as the judge: "If these Jurors will put themselves upon the Bench, with Judges, they must be content to take the like fate with them, when they are observed to do amiss." WOMOCK, supra note 174, at 25. Womock thus countered the policy rationale for privileging jurors with a policy rationale of his own, noting that unrestrained power for any of the participants in the trial judgment raises the threat of arbitrary or prejudiced behavior, with the result that all must be equally eligible for censure. Whereas the victims of the Stuarts' libel and treason prosecutions belonged to a cohesive faction willing to embrace an implausible justification so long as it suited their political needs, the Anti-Federalists of the 1780s lacked the incentive to ignore the reality about the juries' knowledge of the cases before them. The Restoration Whigs developed their nullification arguments as a means of self-defense in the face of a direct threat, but the later eighteenth-century arguments advanced by both Federalists and Anti-Federalists were more hypothetical in nature. Rather than attempting to defend their actions, these commentators sought persuasive justifications for the laws they were crafting, and to some extent they were also weighing policy arguments to determine which rules to adopt. In consequence, they often invoked the "personal knowledge" argument half-heartedly or turned instead to the jurors' obligation to find according to their conscience. These recyclings of the Restoration Whigs' arguments, however, help to remind us of the process by which Vaughan's earlier exponents put these twin justifications into circulation at a time when they could be taken up, multiplied, and refined, so that the latter explanation was ultimately preserved when the first one finally lost its power.
As noted above, one of the most remarkable aspects of the debate over Bushell's Case involves the Tories' willingness to concede that petit jurors have a right to find law. That concession suggests that despite Vaughan's own views about nullification, his decision quickly took on a meaning that he would have rejected. Although the holding in Bushell's Case marks an important moment in the history of jury nullification, the case's importance also depends in part on the debates it provoked. The full significance of a legal decision is rarely discernible from the outset; rather, decisions acquire meaning as they are used by other courts and commentators. Thus, a historical understanding of the nature of jury nullification in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries must attend not only to the language of Vaughan's decision, but also to the debates that followed. Although a consideration of Bushell's Case, in isolation, would find little scope for any law-finding right on the jury's part, such a right finds a much stronger foundation in the legal and rhetorical battles that Vaughan's opinion engendered.
